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PARIS ALSO FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LOWENSTEIN

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AFTER VIETNAM: DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY LOWENSTEIN AND GERMAN PROFESSOR KARL
KAISER ADDRESS NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY (NAA)

REF: A. USNATO 2958 B. USNATO 2841 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: MISSION REPORTS HERewith ON A PROVOCATIVE
AND INFORMATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE U.S. ROLE IN THE WESTERN
ALLIANCE. DEBATE WHICH TOOK PLACE AT SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NAA POLITICAL COMMITTEE MAY STIMULATE CONTINUING COMMENTARY
IN NATO CAPITALS IN LIGHT OF NATO SUMMIT REAFFIRMATION OF
U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE. END SUMMARY.

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1. AT ITS MAY 23 MEETING, THE NAA POLITICAL COMMITTEE DEVOTED
THREE-HOUR MORNING SESSION TO PRESENTATIONS AND A COLLOQUIUM
ON THE SUBJECT "THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPE--TO SHARE THE BURDEN
OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED

STATES." THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKERS WERE: PROFESSOR KARL KAISER, GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE, BONN; AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES LOWENSTEIN. PRESENTATIONS BY THE TWO SPEAKERS WERE ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED BY THE NAA AS "STIMULATING," "FRANK" AND "INFORMATIVE", AND THESE, TOGETHER WITH SPIRITED REACTIONS FROM MORE THAN A DOZEN ALLIED PARLIAMENTARIANS PROVIDED A LIVELY AND INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

2. PROFESSOR KAISER'S TALK DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING THESIS:

-- FOR THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN EUROPE, THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT IN DOUBT. RATHER, EUROPEANS ON BALANCE WELCOME THE END OF U.S. INDOCHINA INVOLVEMENT BECAUSE IT SIGNALS THE END OF U.S. DOMESTIC TURMOIL AND OF THE DRAIN ON AMERICAN RESOURCES.

--MOSCOW VIEWS END OF WAR AS NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE IT SIGNALS END OF DRAIN ON U.S. RESOURCES AND OF STRAIN ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT POLITICAL ALIGNMENT INDOCHINA PENINSULA WILL ASSUME.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EAST-WEST CONFLICT IS NO LONGER DOMINATING INFLUENCE AS ALLIED NATIONS ARE TURNED INWARD AND FOCUSING ON INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THIS IS EVIDENT IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE IN NORWAY, DENMARK, AND ELSEWHERE ON NORTHERN FLANK.

--ON THE OTHER HAND, NATO IS FREE OF "THE ENORMOUS POLITICAL BURDEN" OF THE FORMER REGIMES IN ATHENS AND LISBON. BUT ALLIES ARE ACTING FOOLISHLY REGARDING NEW SITUATION IN PORTUGAL. GOAL SHOULD BE SIMPLY TO PREVENT PORTUGAL FROM FALLING INTO THE WARSAW PACT CAMP.

--ONE WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE TO OFFER A TYPE OF NATO MEMBERSHIP TO PORTUGAL AND CERTAIN OTHER ALLIES THAT WILL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CORRESPOND TO PLURALISTIC POLITICAL REALITIES.

--COUNCIL SHOULD RECONSIDER PRESENT EQUALITY OF STATUS AND RESPONSIBILITY AMONG ALLIES AND INVESTIGATE ADVISABILITY OF A MORE FLEXIBLE ALLIANCE STRUCTURE THAT WOULD INCLUDE DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS TO ACCOMMODATE DIFFERING POLITICAL PREFERENCES.

--NATO MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO MEDIATE IN GREECE-TURKEY DISPUTE. FOR FUTURE, ALLIANCE SHOULD SET UP MACHINERY TO PLAY ACTIVE ROLE IN MEDIATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN MEMBERS.

--THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE AND ADOPT ITS DEFENSES

TO "AMBIGUOUS AGGRESSION," INCLUDING EXPLOITATION OF SOCIAL UNREST, TERRORISM, AND ECONOMIC WARFARE. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS MUST BE FUNCTIONING IN ORDER FOR POLITICAL MILITARY SECURITY TO BE POSSIBLE.

--ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSULT NOW ON PROBLEMS WHICH WILL ARISE ON CONTINGENCY OF RENEWED CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO HAVE A POLICY RE YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO.

--ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, COMPARED TO THE BEGINNING OF 1974, THE WEST HAS SHOWN REMARKABLE CAPACITY TO SETTLE DISPUTES, RESOLVE CRISES, AND DEVELOP NEW MACHINERY TO COPE WITH NEW INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES.

3. TEXT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LOWENSTEIN'S ADDRESS FOLLOWS:

WHILE I REALIZE THAT IS IS CUSTOMARY TO BEGIN APPEARANCES SUCH AS THESE BY SAYING THAT IT IS A PRIVILEGE AND PLEASURE TO ADDRESS WHATEVER THE GROUP IN QUESTION HAPPENS TO BE, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BELIEVE ME WHEN I SAY THAT I DO NOT BEGIN WITH THIS USUAL FORMULA SIMPLY OUT OF HABIT. BEFORE COMING TO MY PRESENT POSITION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THIRTEEN MONTHS AGO, I HAD SPENT NINE YEARS ON THE STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. THUS, I HAVE A PERSONAL REASON FOR EXPRESSING MY PLEASURE AT BEING BACK AGAIN WITH MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FRATERNITY COMPOSED OF THOSE ELECTED TO OFFICE. AND AS ONE WHOSE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES WERE STRONGLY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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INFLUENCED BY NINE YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, I DO CONSIDER IT A PRIVILEGE TO BE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE MET WHAT IS FOR ME--WHO HAS NEVER MET IT MYSELF--THE MOST RIGID TEST OF POLITICAL ACUMEN: THE TEST OF BEING ELECTED TO OFFICE.

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YOU WHO HAVE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF SERVICE IN A LEGISLATIVE BODY
HAVE A TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE WHEN YOU CONSIDER FOREIGN POLICY
QUESTIONS FOR YOU ARE MORE KEENLY AWARE THAN MY COLLEAGUES IN
THE WORLD OF DIPLOMACY, WHO HAVE NOT HAD THAT EXPERIENCE,
THAT THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN A FREE SOCIETY
IS NEVER NEAT OR PRECISE. THE FACT THAT THE DIVERSITY WITHIN
EACH OF OUR NATIONS AND THE EVER CHANGING NATURE OF OUR
COMPLEX AND VOLATILE SOCIETIES OFTEN RESULT IN FOREIGN
POLICIES THAT ARE AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTIONARY IS FAMILIAR
AND UNDERSTANDABLE TO YOU. PERHAPS IT IS THE ONLY CONSTANT
IN YOUR WORLD OF POLITICAL VARIABLES.

YET IS ALSO SEEMS TO BE A FACT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THAT WHILE WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE AMBIGUITIES OF OUR OWN
POLICIES, BEACUSE WE UNDERSTAND THE VARIETY OF VIEWS
WITHIN OUR OWN COUNTRIES, WE ARE OFTEN IRRITATED AND CONFUSED
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WHEN OTHER NATIONS GIVE WHAT SEEM TO BE CONTRADICTIONARY SIGNALS.

IN THE UNITED STATES FOR EXAMPLE, THE SUSPENSION OF MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO TURKEY--A SUSPENSION THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH HAS OPPOSED, JOINED ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO BY THE SENATE--
HAS NOT ONLY STRAINED OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BUT HAS ALSO
COMPLICATED THE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND LED TO
CHARGES THAT WHILE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS MAY BE WILLING
TO ENTER INTO LONG RANGE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS,
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO HONOR THESE COMMITMENTS.

WITHOUT MEANING IN ANY WAY TO DISMISS THE GRAVITY OF THE
QUESTION OF CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, I WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT THAT THE DOMESTIC DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
WHICH THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCHES REFLECTS ARE NOT UNUSUAL. HOWEVER MUCH WE IN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, AND THE TURKS, WHO ARE OF COURSE MOST DIRECTLY
AFFECTED, MAY REGRET THIS DISPUTE, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD
AND ACCEPTED AS AN INHERENT PRODUCT OF OUR PLURALISTIC

SOCIETY, AS AN INTERGRAL PART OF THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. SUCH DISPUTES OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR TRANS-ATLANTIC PARTNERS. BUT SURELY THESE DISPUTES SHOULD NOT SURPRISE ANY OF US FOR THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PRESENT AND THEY PROBABLY ALWAYS WILL BE.

SINCE THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II WHEN SOVIET FORCES SEEMED TO REPRESENT A CLEAR AND IMMINENT DANGER TO THE WEST, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE KINDS OF AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. YOU WILL ALL REMEMBER, I AM SURE, THAT 10 YEARS AGO A HARVARD PROFESSOR WROTE A BOOK ABOUT OUR ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE ENTITLED "THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP." IN THAT BOOK, PROFESSOR KISSINGER SUGGESTED THAT EVEN SUCH AN ESSENTIALLY SOUND RELATIONSHIP AS THAT BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES WAS PRONE TO RESENTMENTS AND UNCERTAINTIES. FROM THE EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW, AMERICA SOMETIMES LOOMED TOO LARGE--OVERWHELMING AND OVERBEARING, THE POST WAR EQUIVALENT OF THE DECISIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN EUROPE AS OVER-SEXED AND OVER HERE.

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FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW, EUROPEANS APPEARED QUERULONS AND CHRONICALLY DISSATISFIED, AND IT SEEMED TO US THAT THERE WAS NO WAY WE COULD STEER THE PROPER COURSE. IF WE ATTEMPTED TOO MUCH, WE WERE ACCUSED OF HEGEMONIAL INTENT--OF TRYING TO DOMINATE. IF WE ATTEMPTED TOO LITTLE, WE WERE ACCUSED OF AVOIDING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES--OF RETREATING INTO ISOLATIONISM. EVEN NOW, ON THE EVE OF THE NATO SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT WHICH--AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF MOST OF THE ALLIES--THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF OUR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WILL MEET AGAIN IN A SYMBOLIC RE-AFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE TIES, ONE HEARS IN THE BACKGROUND UNDERTONES OF DOUBT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT AMERICA'S ROLE IN IT.

THE SOURCE OF MUCH OF THIS UNEASINESS IS SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE QUESTIONS THAT ARISE IN THE WAKE OF EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM ARE OBVIOUS: HOW DO OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE PERCEIVE THE UNITED STATES AFTER THESE EVENTS? WILL THEY CONCLUDE THAT WE DO NOT HONOR OUR COMMITMENTS, THAT WE HAVE LOST BOTH OUR WILL AND OUR NERVE? WE IN THE UNITED STATES REALIZE THAT IT WOULD BE IRRATIONAL FOR US NOT TO ASSUME--AND UNREALISTIC NOT TO ADMIT--THAT YOU IN EUROPE COULD REACH PRECISELY THESE CONCLUSIONS.

IF YOU HAVE DONE SO NOTHING THAT CAN BE SAID CAN PERSUADE YOU OTHERWISE. WE REALIZE THAT YOU WILL JUDGE US BY WHAT WE DO, NOT BY WHAT WE SAY, AND THAT WE WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO CONDUCT OURSELVES IN WAYS THAT WILL COMPEL YOU--NOT ENABLE YOU, BUT

COMPEL YOU--TO CONCLUDE THAT WE WILL REMAIN FAITHFUL TO OUR
TREATY COMMITMENTS AND DETERMINED TO MEET OUR INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES.

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WE REALIZE, TOO, THAT WHETHER WE CAN SUCCEED IN TRANSLATING
THESE WORDS INTO DEEDS WILL DEPEND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ON
THE SUPPORT OF ALL AMERICANS. FOR ALLIANCES AND FRIENDSHIPS,
WHETHER THEY ARE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS OR NATIONS, CANNOT BE
DICTATED OR MANDATED BY FOREIGN OFFICES OR LEGISLATIVE ENACT-
MENTS. THEY MUST BE BASED ON A DEEPLY FELT APPRECIATION OF
COMMON INTERESTS PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES.

THESE COMMON INTERESTS, PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES CANNOT REMAIN
STATIC. TO BE RELEVANT TO REALITY, THEY MUST CHANGE AS THE
WORLD CHANGES. WHEN OUR ALLIANCE WAS FIRST FORMED, WE LIVED
IN A BIPOLAR WORLD BASED ON THE ANTAGONISMS OF A COLD WAR AND
WERE THUS PREOCCUPIED WITH QUESTIONS OF DEFENSE. TODAY, IN
AN INCREASINGLY MULTIPOLAR WORLD, AN ERA OF DETENTE AND A TIME OF
PROFOUND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE, THE MANKIND OF OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES--COUNTRIES THAT ARE

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THEMSELVES STRONGER AND CONSIDDERABLY MORE INDEPENDENT THAN DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD-IS SUBSTANTIALY MORE DIFFICULT. THIS IS THE FIRST CHANGE WE IN THE UNITED STATES SEE.

THE SECOND CHANGE IS THE INCREASED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG STATES. DESPITE THEIR INCREASED STRENGTH AND GREATER INDEPENDENCE, BEACUSE OF THEIR VERY NATURE HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES ARE LINKED EVER MORE CLOSELY BOTH TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THE PROBLEMS OF ENERGY OF RESOURCES, OF THE ENVIRONMENT--INDEED ALL COMMERCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTERCHANGE--HAVE MADE US ALL MORE DEPENDENT ON OTHERS, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO MADE US MORE VULNERABLE TO OTHERS.

THE THIRD CHANGE, PERHAPS A SOMEWHAT LESS PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE, IS THE TENDENCY WITHIN INDIVIDUAL BODIES OF POLITIC TO LOOK INWARD--TO GIVE PRIORITY TO DOMESTIC NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR LOCAL PROBLEMS BECAUSE THEY SEEM BOTH MORE IMMEDIATE AND MORE MANGEABLE. THIS TENDENCY TO PAROCHIALISM EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. IT CAN BE SEEN IN THE UNITED STATES VERY CLEARLY IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS. A RECENT POLL, ANALYZED IN THE SEMI-ANNUAL PUBLICATION "STATE OF THE NATION", TELLS THE STORY SUCCINCTLY. IN 1964, WHEN ASKED BY PUBLIC OPINION ANALYSTS WHAT 30 PROBLEMS MOST CONCERNED THEM, AMERICANS FIRST LISTED FIVE SUBJECTS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL AFFARIS AND DEFENSE. THEY WERE, IN ORDER: THE DANGER OF WAR, THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM, KEEPING OUR DEFENSE FORCES STRONG, MAINTAINING RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES ABROAD, THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA. THE FIRST DOMESTIC PROBLEM WAS IN SIXTH PLACE AND THAT PROBLEM WAS MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER.

IN 1974, WHEN ASKED THE SAME QUESTION, THE FIRST SIXTEEN SUBJECTS LISTED ALL RELATED TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. THEY WERE, IN ORDER: THE RISE IN PRICES AND THE COST OF LIVING; VIOLENCE CRIME, AND CORRUPTION; DRUGS; MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE; CONSUMER PROTECTION; ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS; ENERGY SHORTAGES; POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT; GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; AND GARBAGE AND TRASH RECYCLING. ONLY IN SEVENTEENTH PLACE WAS A NON-DOMESTIC PROBLEM LISTED AND THAT WAS KEEPING OUR MILITARY AND DEFENSE FORCES STRONG. MAINTAINING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES WAS NINETEENTH ON THE LIST--BUT IT WAS AHEAD OF THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM, THE DANGER OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN A WAR, THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA.

CAN THE SAME PAROCHIAL TENDENCIES FAVORING REGIONAL OR LOCAL INTERESTS OVER BORADER NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS BE SEEN IN THE SECTARIAN TROUBLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE ENMITY BETWEEN WALLOONS AND FLEMINGS, THE DEMANDS OF SCOTS WHO WANT A LERGER PART OF THE BENEFITS OF NORTH SEA OIL TO

STAY IN SCOTLAND, THE MOVEMENTS FOR ETHNIC SEPARATISM OR EVEN INDEPENDENCE AMONG WELSHMEN, CORSICANS, BRETONS AND BASQUES? PERHAPS THESE PHENOMENA, TOO, ARE VISIBLE SYMPTOMS OF LOYALTIES TIED CLOSER TO HOME AND A SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUCTURES.

THE FOURTH CHANGE WE SEE IS RELATED TO THE THIRD, AND IN A SENSE UNDERLIES ALL THE OTHER: THE FACT, SO OBVIOUS IT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED OR MISUNDERSTOOD, THAT A NEW GENERATION HAS COME OF POLITICAL AGE SINCE THE BIRTH OF THE ALLIANCE 26 YEARS AGO. I AM NOT PART OF THIS NEW GENERATION. I WAS JUST EIGHTEEN YEARS OLD WHEN WORLD WAR II ENDED. I WAS EDUCATED DURING THE WORST COLD-WAR YEARS, I BEGAN MY GOVERNMENT SERVICE WITH THE MARSHALL PLAN AND NATO WHILE IT WAS STILL IN LONDON. I SERVED IN THE MILITARY DURING THE KOREAN WAR. BUT I AM ALMOST 48. AND MY GENERATION IS ALREADY BEING REPLACED BY THOSE WHO ARE EIGHT TO TEN YEARS YOUNGER. THEY WERE BETWEEN EIGHT AND TEN WHEN WORLD WAR II ENDED AND BETWEEN THIRTEEN AND FIFTEEN WHEN THE KOREAN WAR BEGAN. THIS IS THE GENERATION THAT NOW MAKES UP THE BULK OF OUR POPULATION. IT IS THE GENERATION THAT IS NOW BEING ELECTED TO OUR CONGRESS AND YOUR PARLIAMENTS.

IN THE UNITED STATES, THIS GENERATION WAS PERSONALLY UNAWARE

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OF WORLD WAR II, THE COLD WAR AND KOREA. BUT THEY WERE TRAUMATIZED BY VIETNAM AND DISILLUSIONED BY WATERGATE, AND THE EFFECT OF THESE EXPERIENCES HAS BEEN TO AROUSE IN THEM WHAT SEEMS TO BE A LATENT ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI-INTERVENTIONISM THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRESENT IN THE AMERICAN PSYCHE.

ARE SUCH ATTITUDES ALSO TO BE FOUND AMONG THE YOUNGER GENERATION IN EUROPE? I WAS STRUCK BY THE REMARK OF A LEADING WEST GERMAN POLITICAL LEADER--AND A CONSERVATIVE AT THAT--WHO RECENTLY SAID OF HIS CHILDREN DURING A VISIT TO WASHINGTON: "THEY DON'T EXPECT ANYTHING FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THEY HAVE NO INTEREST IN BUILDING EUROPEAN OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. FOR THEM, POLITICS MEANS CHANGING GERMAN SOCIETY." I REMARKED AT THE BEGINNING OF MY TALK ON THE AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS IN POLICIES DEVELOPED BY PLURALISTIC DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. THE ATTITUDE OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION
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ADDS ANOTHER ELEMENT TO THE PROBLEM OF BUILDING A CONSENSUS OF ON PARTICULAR ISSUES OF FOREIGN POLICY. IN SO FAR AS US RELATIONS WITH EUROPE ARE CONCERNED, THAT AMBIGUITY IS SEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, IN THE TENDENCY TOWARDS INTROSPECTION, TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BY A DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO FULFILL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN EUROPE.

THESE TWO TENDENCIES ARE EVIDENT WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO BUSINESS KEEPING 300,000 TROOPS IN EUROPE THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR, THAT IT IS UN-AMERICAN TO DO SO--REMINISCENT OF AN EARLIER ERA WHEN WE SENT MARINES TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND CHINA, AS UNSEEMLY FOR AMERICA TO PROVIDE AS IT IS UNNECESSARY FOR A HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED AND PROSPEROUS WESTERN EUROPE TO ACCEPT. THESE ARE NOT MY VIEWS, THEY ARE NOT THE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THEY DO NOT REPRESENT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT THEY ARE THE VIEWS OF MANY WHO ARE ACCUSED OF BEING NEOISOLATIONISTS BUT WHO CAN BE MORE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED, AS I HAVE SAID, AS ANTI-INTERVENTIONISTS).

MANY OTHER AMERICANS--INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY IN THE CONGRESS--DO NOT AGREE. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE VALIDITY OF OUR ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS BY MAINTAINING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF UNITED STATES FORCES. THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE MAJORITY VIEW WAS MADE PLAIN EARLY THIS WEEK WHEN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTED BY MORE THAN A 3 TO 1 MARGIN AGAINST A PROPOSAL TO REMOVE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF US FORCES FROM ABROAD.

FROM EVERYTHING THAT I KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY IN EUROPE IN THIS POST VIETNAM PERIOD, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SEE NO INDICATIONS OF ANY EROSION IN OUR ALLIANCE COMMITMENT. THAT

POINT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE A NUMBER OF TIMES IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND I AM SURE IT WILL BE MADE AGAIN BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE VISITS BURSSLS NEXT WEEK. BUT, AS I HAVE SAID, SUCH STATEMENTS ARE NOT SUBSTITUTES FOR ACTION, AND YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO FORM YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS ON THE BASIS OF HOW WE CONDUCT OURSELVES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

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I AM CONVINCED THAT WE WILL CONDUCT OURSELVES IN WAYS THAT WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT WE CAN BE INTROSPECTIVE WITHOUT BEING ISOLATIONIST, THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO HAVE STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COMMITMENTS WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO DOMESTIC CRITICISM FOR BEING INTER-VENTIONIST AND THAT WE CAN DISCHARGE OUR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES IN EUROPE WITHOUT DEFAULTING ON TASKS AT HOME. FOR AMONG ALL OF OUR SECURITY COMMITMENTS ABROAD, AMERICANS TAKE THESE IN EUROPE MOST SERIOUSLY. MOST AMERICANS ARE PROUD OF THE ROLE WE HAVE PLAYED IN EUROPE. AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT WITHOUT OUR HELP TO EUROPE IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE GENERAL WORLD ORDER FOR THIRTY YEARS IN THE FACE OF SERIOUS THREATS FROM THOSE WHO WISHED TO CHANGE IT IN A WAY THAT WOULD HAVE INVOLVED UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. AMERICANS GENERALLY TAKE GREAT SATISFACTION IN HAVING PROVIDED MORE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OTHERS THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, IN HAVING CONTRIBUTED MORE FOOD, EDUCATED MORE PEOPLE FROM OTHER LANDS AND WELCOMED MORE IMMIGRANTS.

BUT THOSE THIRTY YEARS OF PEAC AND PROSPERITY HAVE COME AT A HIGH COST. IT IS A COST THAT AMERICANS ARE UNWILLING TO BEAR ALONE. AND SINCE A VIABLE AMERICAN POLICY DEPENDS, AS I HAVE SAID, ON THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND SINCE THAT SUPPORT IS CONTINGENT ON AN AMERICAN PERCEPTION THAT EUROPE IS DOING ITS SHARE, AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE NOW DEPENDS AS MUCH UPON YOU AS IT DEPENDS UPON US. BUT IS THAT NOT, AFTER ALL, THE ESSENCE OF PARTNERSHIP?

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PROFESSOR KARL KAISER ADDRESS NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY (NAA)
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE INFO BONN
BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN
LONDON
OSLO

PARIS

ROME

Type: TE

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